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Janis A. Emmanouilidis and Almut Metz 
 
Key points: 
• The European Union (EU) must be able to shape developments in a new political and 
economic global environment that is more and more determined by events taking place far 
beyond its borders.  
• Europe’s ability to exert its influence both internally and externally requires a renewal of the 
European integration project. This task elicits three strategic responses: 
(1) A strategy of institutional efficiency that entails two things: First, the elaboration of a 
“Treaty Amending the Treaty of Nice”, that incorporates the central innovations of the 
Constitutional Treaty into the existing primary law. Second, the heterogeneity of an EU2
27+ requires a higher level of differentiation among member states, that will lead to 
divergent leadership coalitions and not to a core Europe. 
(2) A strategy for shaping global politics that begins in the EU’s immediate geographic 
vicinity. The possibility of joining the EU must remain open to all European states even if 
the prospect of membership is (very) distant. However, the Union should, in the 
immediate perspective, not grant any further accession offers beyond Turkey and the 
Western Balkans. In the international arena, the assertion of global interests requires a 
more determined effort to pool European defence capabilities by creating a European 
Army. 
(3) A strategy for the promotion of European self2assurance that requires two things: First, a 
gradual politicization of European policy2making on both the national and the European 
level. Second, the definition of a new raison d’être underpinned by a grand project in the 
field of security. 
Europe has two faces. On the one hand, there was a time when Europeans were enchanted by 
the miracle of integration. After having experienced bitter centuries of war and enmity, imperial 
devastation, and outbursts of nationalism, the nations of Europe had moved in precisely the 
opposite direction. Although the European success story continues to this day, it nowadays 
resembles the description of a distant epoch. Perceptions of the European Union are increasingly 
characterized by a resurgence of national egoism and by declining levels of public approval. 
In this situation, it is helpful to recall the heart of the current problem inside the EU, which is the 
conceptual schism among the member states. The arguments are ostensibly about treaty texts, 
though deep down it is a matter of antagonistic views of the shape of things to come. If it proves 
impossible to reach some kind of agreement about the future political order of the continent, the
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Europe of 25 and soon more member states may well go into decline, and may possibly even fall 
apart. 
The basic strategic question concerning the EU’s future remains unanswered: Why is there a 
need to undertake new efforts, why is it necessary to mobilize new forces? The answer to this 
question is linked to the new constellations and conditions of world politics. It has to do with 
Europe’s future ability to shape developments in a changing global economic and political 
environment. Following the rise of new powers in Asia and South America and the globalization 
of economy and security, Europe’s future is increasingly being determined by developments that 
take place beyond its borders. There is a danger that the old continent will gradually become 
marginalized.  
Europe has the potential to inject its own ideas into the formulation of the rules governing the 
new economic and political world order. However, Europe’s ability to exert its influence will 
depend on whether Europeans are able to renew the “European answer”. Providing Europe with 
a new raison d’être requires the EU to assert itself both internally and externally, and to clearly 
communicate the reasons for further European integration to citizens. This tripartite task elicits 
three strategic responses: 
(1)  A Strategy of Institutional Efficiency 
A structural feature of Europe’s institutional architecture is the fact that it is constantly changing. 
Deepening and geographical widening require a political system that is stable but at the same 
time able to adapt to new circumstances. Today again, the Union needs to guarantee its 
institutional efficiency. In this respect two things are particularly important: the outcome of the 
EU’s constitutional process and the progression of further differentiation in Europe. 
Europe’s Constitutional Process 
The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the electorate in two EU founding states means that 
another historic attempt to provide Europe with a reliable political order has probably failed. 
Nonetheless, the EU227+ still needs to optimize its current structures and procedures. Numerous 
alternative proposals to the Constitutional Treaty have been put on the table in the aftermath of 
the negative referendum results in France and the Netherlands – but none of them seem 
promising: 
• The retention of the Treaty of Nice currently in force is to all intents and purposes not a 
viable option. The EU227+ cannot be governed on the basis of a set of rules and regulations 
that in essence was originally conceived for six states. Without substantial amendments to 
the Treaty of Nice the EU will sooner or later experience a dramatic crisis of legitimacy. 
• The option of holding on to the original Constitutional Treaty implies that the French and 
Dutch electorates will be asked to vote on the new primary law once again. However, the 
chances that a second referendum will be more successful than the first seem rather slim. 
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• The option of “making the most of Nice” is not sufficient to enhance the enlarged EU’s 
future efficiency or democratic legitimacy. The implementation of constitutional innovations 
on the basis of the existing Treaties and thus beneath the level of formal amendments to 
primary law – for example, in the shape of inter2institutional agreements or modified rules of 
procedure – is unlikely to be achieved in many important cases. Attempts to unravel the 
package as a whole and to “cherry2pick” individual elements of the Constitutional Treaty will 
repeatedly come up against the opposition from certain member states and thus fail. 
• Another option would be to present the electorate with a “shortened constitution” possibly 
using the terminology of a “basic treaty” and combining Parts I, II and IV of the 
Constitutional Treaty. This alternative is also rather problematic. On the one hand, the 
opponents of the Constitution will argue that it is simply duplicitous. On the other hand, this 
alternative would also require a revision of Part III of the constitutional text – an extremely 
time2consuming process that could not be completed without calling yet another Convention. 
As the above options are not viable, there is need for another alternative in case the 
Constitutional Treaty cannot enter into force. A pragmatic option would be to transfer the core of 
the constitutional innovations into primary law in the shape of a treaty amending the Treaty of 
Nice. The provocatively titled “Constitution” would be transformed into a modest revision of the 
Treaty of Nice, thereby making it possible to incorporate the core constitutional reforms into the 
existing Treaties. To apply this alternative, it would be necessary to identify the central reforms of 
the Constitution and combine them in the shape of a treaty amending the primary law currently 
in force. A “Treaty Amending the Treaty of Nice” seems a realistic alternative, which would not 
disrespect the vote of the French and Dutch electorates, yet at the same time would secure the 
implementation of the basic constitutional reforms. 
The modesty of a “Treaty Amending the Treaty of Nice” could provide the impetus for a decisive 
spurt ahead. The next step would be to elaborate and adopt a less voluminous text that contains 
only the principal constitutional provisions while relegating the detailed non2constitutional parts 
to a text below the constitutional level. The constitutional part would by and large include Part I, 
II and IV of the Constitutional Treaty (CT). The second part would resemble Part III (CT). 
However, in practice it will not suffice to pull Parts I, II and IV (CT) together in one document and 
to expel Part III (CT) from a new Constitution. Simplifying the EU’s primary law will necessitate 
major changes to Part III and a number of technical and some politically highly sensible changes 
to the remaining parts of the Constitutional Treaty (e.g. new ratification procedure). The 
elaboration of a “Constitution II” will require yet another Convention and a subsequent 
intergovernmental conference. This process will take years. Takeing into account the present 
political situation in the member states, one can expect that such an enterprise could begin after 
the European Parliament (EP) elections in 2009 – the earliest. In the meantime, the EU should 
work out a mandate for this enterprise: A “Laeken II” defining the concrete objectives for a new 
Convention. 
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Differentiation in Europe 
The increasing diversity of interests and the growing complexity of decision2making inside the 
Union call for a greater degree of active and visible political management. More than ever 
before, Europe needs various speeds in order to remain effective.  
Citizens expect the EU to provide state2like services in areas as diverse as justice and home 
affairs, foreign, security, defence, tax, environmental, and social policy. However, not all of the 
member states can or may wish to provide such services at the same time and with the same 
intensity. As was the case in the past with the common currency, the Schengen accords, or social 
policy, closer cooperation among a smaller group of countries can help to overcome a situation 
of stalemate and improve the functioning of the EU. 
The formation of islands of differentiated integration should not be equated with the creation of 
a closed core Europe. Debates about a Europe of triumvirates, directorates or pioneer groups – 
which some demand and others fear – are unrealistic and counter2productive. They are 
unrealistic because the idea of a closed core Europe, in which a small group of countries 
continues the unification process, is unfeasible. The vast majority of member states will want to 
belong to any group moving ahead – and none of the potential core countries would deny them 
their participation. Debates about the establishment of a core Europe are counter2productive, 
because threats and conceptual misunderstandings overshadow the fact that differentiation 
provides a key strategic opportunity. Bringing the notion of differentiated integration into 
disrepute makes it impossible to utilize its formative potential to the full.  
The real potential of increased differentiation inside Europe will be revealed only in practice. In 
the years ahead, greater use should be made of the various instruments of differentiated 
integration. It will be particularly important that the EU institutions and the member states 
become familiar with the instrument of enhanced cooperation that was introduced in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and modified by the Treaty of Nice and the Constitutional Treaty. The instrument 
of enhanced cooperation, which has not been employed in practice, should initially be used in 
the context of smaller differentiation projects in various policy areas. Only then will it be possible 
to ascertain how well its legal provisions work in practice and where improvements are needed 
in order to increase the usefulness of this key instrument of differentiation. 
In political practice, using instruments of differentiation to solve individual questions will not lead 
to an exclusive core of states, but to divergent leadership coalitions. The total sum of individual 
cooperation projects and the intersection of the participating countries will create an “open area 
of gravitation” that attracts other EU states to engage in a more intense level of cooperation.  
(2)  A Strategy for Shaping Global Politics 
The global political landscape is characterized by changing constellations involving new powers 
and unprecedented challenges. New risks and threats combined with a high energy dependency, 
growing migration pressure, the geographic proximity to future crisis regions, and the vital 
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significance of unimpeded world trade for EU economies, make Europe a particularly vulnerable 
continent. 
Europe cannot afford to stand on the sidelines when economic and political developments 
require the establishment of new forms of order. The EU’s international responsibilities begin in 
its immediate geographic vicinity. However, Europe also needs to have at its disposal sufficient 
resources to protect its interests and project its power in the global arena. 
Stabilizing the Neighbourhood 
The EU has a special responsibility toward Southeastern Europe. The prospect of accession for 
the states of the Western Balkans promotes reforms and western2oriented and liberal political 
forces in the countries concerned, and is in the fundamental interests of the EU and its member 
states. Only the full and equal integration of the Balkan countries into the Union can secure the 
strategic advantages that the EU already derives from association and gradual convergence. A 
receding prospect of EU membership could cause the status quo that has already been attained 
in the region to be called into question. Disappointment and the lack of a perspective might lead 
to new outbursts of violence among the various ethnic groups, the costs of which would have to 
be borne not only by the region, but also by the EU and its member states. 
The European Council gave all states of the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro – a specific prospect of EU membership as early as 
1999, and has confirmed this offer on numerous occasions. Accession negotiations are currently 
in progress with Croatia, and Macedonia has been granted candidate status. After the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania, there will be even greater pressure to close the “black hole” on the 
map of Europe. Southeastern enlargement – which is not comparable to the 2004 enlargement 
round in terms of either size or political and economic consequences – is not a question of 
whether or not, but of when and how. 
But the EU’s attractiveness does not end in the Balkans. The start of accession negotiations with 
Turkey means that Europe has finally come to a point where it no longer has definitive borders. 
In essence, the decision concerning Turkey marks the start of a large2scale process of 
enlargement reaching far beyond the Balkans, and where this will end is currently impossible to 
say. Europe urgently needs to understand the strategic ramifications of the path on which it has 
embarked. 
In view of the perspective of a continuous widening process the EU needs to consider the 
following: (i) The Union should not shut its doors to potential newcomers. The possibility of 
joining the EU must remain open to all European states even if the prospect of membership is 
(very) distant. (ii) However, the EU should in the immediate perspective not grant any further 
binding accession offers beyond the Western Balkans and Turkey. Taking into account the 
increasing enlargement fatigue in the EU member states, enlargement beyond the Balkans and 
Turkey should be forestalled for a specific period of time. (iii) The EU should continue to deepen 
relations with neighbouring European states in the context of a differentiated policy toward 
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Eastern Europe. The Union needs a genuine strategy for the Black Sea region and a strategy for 
Central Asia – two regions that are becoming ever more important in terms of security and 
energy policy. (iv) Cooperation with the EU’s immediate neighbours in Eastern Europe, the Black 
Sea region and Central Asia requires an active partnership with Russia. The relationship between 
the EU and Russia should be reformulated with regard to both form and content by 2007, when 
the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement expires. At the same time, the EU must 
emphasize the values and principles on which cooperation is based, and the necessity of 
democratic reforms in Russia. 
Promoting World Peace and Asserting Global Interests 
The European Union is a factor to be reckoned with in world politics on account alone of its 
sheer size and economic strength. However, Europe is a very vulnerable actor and no member 
state acting on its own is in a position to master the new global challenges. 
Despite numerous advances in recent years, security and defence policy in Europe is still 
characterized by divergent national approaches and perceptions and by persisting claims to 
national sovereignty. The assertion of global interests requires a more determined effort to pool 
European defence capabilities by creating a European Army with the appropriate organizational 
and command structures on the European level.  
The creation of integrated armed forces would enhance Europe’s military capabilities and tie the 
states of Europe closer together in the field of security policy than at any time in their history. 
Interlinking national security and defence policies in this way would increase the pressure on EU 
member states to overcome the current deficit in strategic thinking and to speak with one voice 
regarding even the most sensitive foreign policy issues. Europe would be enabled to engage 
more self2confidently in the concert of international powers and to play a more active and 
relevant role in shaping global developments. 
It may well be that the idea of a European Army is asking too much considering the current level 
of consensus on security and defence policy among EU member states. In this case, it should be 
possible for states that are willing and able to engage in cooperation to move ahead even if not 
all EU countries are prepared to participate. In this regard the possibility of a structured military 
cooperation as envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty points in the right direction. Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom bear particular responsibility. Based on the size of their defence 
expenditures, the existence of national headquarters and the ability to pursue crisis diplomacy on 
the highest level, the “Big Three” possess means and capabilities without which a European 
Army cannot be established.  
(3)  A Strategy for the Promotion of European Self2Assurance 
Europe is stuck in a mental crisis of orientation. This lack of orientation is not a specifically 
European, but a general phenomenon. A hitherto unparalleled degree of mobility, pluralism and 
flexibility has led to the breakdown of traditional types of identification. As a result, there is a 
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fundamental need for guidance. The European Union, as an evolving political system, must 
provide its citizens with a sense of orientation if it wishes to overcome its current crisis of 
legitimacy. 
In order to strengthen European self2assurance, the EU should pursue two things: a gradual 
politicization of European politics, and a new raison d’être underpinned by a new grand project. 
Politicization as Step toward Maturity 
To enhance its legitimacy, the EU must ensure that citizens enjoy greater democratic 
participation. The key to this is the progressive politicization of European policymaking. 
Although the EU’s institutional architecture has developed considerably in recent years, a weak 
point of the system is becoming ever more apparent: European political life lacks the lifeblood of 
a thriving democracy. A political system lives from the clash of colliding arguments, which is the 
essence of politics. In contrast, the EU is structurally oriented toward consensus. Competing 
ideas and concepts are not sufficiently presented and discussed on either the European or the 
national level. As a result, there is, by and large, neither a public nor a media2driven opinion2
forming process about European issues. What can be done to redress this deficit? 
• First, the exaggerated craving for harmony when it comes to Europe is out2dated. 
Disagreement is a constituent element of every political process, and as such should not be 
dramatized on the European level either. Differences of opinion, divergent interests and 
conflicting goals need to be seen as evidence of the vitality of the European policymaking 
process and not as an existential threat. 
• Second, politicization on the European level should emulate what succeeds on the national 
level. Politics is made by people and not by soulless bureaucracies. Those who wish to make 
policymaking comprehensible must ensure that it is associated with identifiable individuals. 
Europe requires a higher level of personalization. Numerous innovations in the Constitutional 
Treaty point in the right direction. The appointment of a President of the European Council, 
the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the strengthening of the Commission 
President would give the EU identifiable faces that would be the focus of trust and distrust, 
approval and rejection. 
• Third, European issues must become a self2evident feature of political debates at all levels. 
Up to now, European citizens rarely interact directly with the Union. Their perceptions of the 
EU rather tend to be filtered through national, regional or local perspectives. If issues related 
to the Union are to play more than a minor role, they must become an integral part of 
political debates in the member states. The strict separation of national and European level 
issues in political discourse needs to be eliminated. The electorate must give politicians on 
the national level also a mandate for their policymaking in the EU. 
• Finally, European elections should be dramatized. By voting for MEPs of their choice, citizens 
should be able to exert a direct influence on the appointment of the President of the 
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Commission. The latter should be nominated by European parties in the run2up to EP 
elections on the basis of a common election manifesto, and elected by the new parliament. 
The President of the Commission duly elected by the EP would then have to be confirmed by 
the Heads of State and Government on the basis of a qualified majority vote. This procedure 
would upgrade the importance of European elections as an act of electoral control and would 
strengthen the legitimacy and power base of the Commission and its President, while 
simultaneously enhancing the significance of the EP. 
A higher degree of politicization will rekindle the interest of the electorate in Europe as a political 
entity. Politicians on the national and European levels would be forced to conduct debates on 
European policy with their voters. In sum, the gradual politicization of the EU would be a decisive 
step toward a more mature political system. 
A New Raison d’être Underpinned by a New Grand Project 
A strategy to enhance the EU in the eyes of its citizens must involve the elaboration of a new 
rationale explaining the necessity of the European project. The Union, far more than its 
constituent nation2states, must offer an autonomous reason that legitimizes its existence. Europe 
needs a convincing and plain answer to a simple question. What do we need the EU for in the 
future – beyond the preservation of what has already been achieved? 
The European Union as a dynamic economic, political and security actor that is able to shape 
both internal and external developments in a dynamic global environment: Putting this abstract 
formula in concrete terms is a prerequisite for conveying the necessity of future integration steps. 
However, it will not be enough to proclaim this new raison d’être in form of a solemn declaration 
replete with group photo. The art of European politics will be to combine such an abstract 
formula with an ambitious yet realistic grand project beyond a “Europe of small projects”. 
European policymaking has always been particularly dynamic and successful whenever it set its 
sights on a large2scale and ambitious goal – the most impressive example being the single 
market project “Europe ‘92”. 
Two areas where there is both a considerable pressure for action and where citizens particularly 
want the EU to deliver seem appropriate for a new grand project: the field of economic and 
social policy, and the area of security. 
Despite its undeniable significance for EU citizens, the thematic cluster of economic and social 
policy seems not very suitable for a new European grand project for a variety of reasons. First, 
the Union does not possess sufficient competences in these areas and it cannot be assumed that 
the member states will be prepared to centralize further responsibilities. Second, a grand project 
that pursues the economic and social modernization of Europe would almost certainly be 
accompanied by drastic cutbacks for a considerable number of people – this is hardly to generate 
“new enthusiasm” for Europe among citizens. Finally, further integration in the areas of 
economic and social policy that goes beyond (i) individual measures to complete the single 
market, (ii) mutual learning in the context of the Open Methods of Coordination, or (iii) a mere 
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synchronization of national economic and social policies would be questionable from an 
economic point of view. Is not the competition between the divergent national systems and 
between the member states’ economies a key reason for Europe’s economic success? 
Europe’s internal and external vulnerability underscores the need to pursue a grand project in the 
area of security. Greater security policy integration can procure benefits for the member states 
and their citizens that the individual countries can no longer provide on their own.  
Since Maastricht, the Union has made considerable progress in the areas of justice and home 
affairs as well as foreign, security and defence policy. Yet, many of the individual measures that 
have been initiated appear to be rather haphazard, and the overall picture lacks coherence. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of conceptual inter2linkage between the various aspects of internal 
and external security. 
Existing projects in the area of security should be embedded within a clear2cut framework with 
ambitious yet realistic goals. The creation of a European Army would be an appropriate goal in 
the area of external security, but this would have to be complemented by an equivalent project in 
the area of internal security. The successful implementation of a grand project in the field of 
security requires the elaboration of a coherent concept that defines European security interests in 
a comprehensive manner, aligns both internal and external as well as civilian and military 
aspects of security policy, identifies the specific measures that are required, and provides a 
timetable that is binding on the participants. 
If policymakers succeed in making the European Union a coherent actor in all aspects of internal 
and external security, Europe will be in a position to make a decisive contribution toward 
shaping the future international order. The epochal decision to embark on the unification project 
once brought peace and prosperity to the European continent. It is now time to view the success 
of the European project from a global perspective. 
 
October 2006 
 
*  The present text is based on a strategy paper entitled “Europe’s Strategic Responses” 
prepared for the 10th International Bertelsmann Forum that took place on 22/23 September 
2006 in Berlin. 
